



SOCIOLOGISTS AND SOCIAL POLICY:

THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENT INVOLVEMENT

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SOCIOLOGISTS AND SOCIAL POLICY: THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENT INVOLVEMENT

DAVID MARSLAND

The nadir of sociology's fortunes as a discipline was marked by the debacle in the early nineteen eighties over the development of the Social Science Research Council. Lord Rothschild's unexpected resistance to Sir Keith (now Lord) Joseph's intention of dispatching the Council altogether succeeded only at the cost of institutionalising general scepticism and popular negativism in relation to sociology.

The glorious hopes of the optimistic era since the Heyworth Report of 1965 for a powerful and respectable future for sociology have come to nothing. The "History Man" is indeed history, almost ancient history, and sociology's failure is a taken-for-granted fact of Britain's official recent past.

The story of sociology's meteoric rise and plummeting descent is vividly revealed, if less than candidly acknowledged, in the British Sociological Association's own account from the horse's mouth, *Sociology: Practice and Progress*.¹ The fact of this extraordinary rise and fall is by now widely admitted. Its causes, by contrast, are fiercely disputed.

Elsewhere I have examined the extent to which ideological bias among sociologists has been an important factor.² Here I argue that another important cause has been our unwillingness to be involved in policy matters, and more broadly in social practice. We have collectively preferred the privileged, irresponsible exclusion from the real world which continued expansion of the domain of ivory towers has offered to us.

If this unwillingness — even incompetence — of sociologists for useful involvement in the real world is challenged, I believe it has been documented persuasively by Payne and his associates' interesting and brave analysis.³ "Although", they say "a number of important figures in the post-war generation were concerned to apply sociological techniques and insights to the solution of social problems, the last twenty years have seen relatively few sociologists involved in this kind of work. If anything the dominant mood has been anti-establishment and anti-empirical, and this in a period which saw a clear call for more social research by administrators". Even more decisively: "It is clear that sociology's impact and influence on social policy innovation has been severely limited and is in fact declining, notwithstanding the expansion in both sociology and policy research in the past twenty years. This state has been brought about by resistance among policy makers and by an increasing anti-policy stance within the discipline."

It is not just "philistine", "Thatcherite" incomprehension of our discipline we have been and are resistant to. We have systematically avoided the challenge of any serious demand

for usable sociological knowledge and for sociological thinking which could realistically inform social policy.

Against the grain of this orthodox other-worldliness, I shall argue here that: whatever the difficulties, sociologists should be fully and actively involved in the policy process: and that whatever the risks and costs, such involvement would produce positive gains for sociology as a discipline, and substantial benefits for the community at large.

Although my analysis is developed specifically in relation to sociology, I believe it is equally relevant to the condition of the apparently more applied and involved disciplines of social administration and social policy. From the start their practical involvement has been, if less than that of sociology, primarily and narrowly *academic*, and thoroughlygoingly *utopian*. Hence their consistently reliable attachment to the welfarist political left, and their naively idealistic resistance to acknowledging realistic constraints on social policy. The missionary zeal of Titmuss and Townsend can hardly be offered as a rebuttal of the proposition that the social sciences refuse any serious involvement with policy and practice, that is unless partisan political involvement is to be defined as serious in the context of the specific purposes of social science. Moreover, both disciplines have in recent years been heavily influenced by marxist ideas. In consequence their claims to be involved in applied work have become as suspect as those of sociologists. The crucial test of the genuine involvement of any social scientists in the policy process is their preparedness to accept positively political assumptions different from their own, and to keep on working actively and practically and other than merely oppositionally in a context defined by such contrary assumptions. By this criterion, as Bulmer's analysis seems to suggest, social administrators and social policy analysts are hardly less culpable than sociologists.⁴

HISTORICAL FOREWORD

In the period of sociology's confident expansion, one of the most influential texts put in front of students of introductory sociology and of research method was Mark Abrams' *Social Surveys and Social Action*.⁵ I want to use Abrams' book as a marker for defining a period in the development of sociology, and its relations with policy and with social praxis more generally, and for symbolizing one important version of sociology's public identity.

Abrams' books rests on assumptions of the "liberalist democratism" of the era which produced the concept of "the end of ideology".⁶ If we take the book as the beginning of a period in which the relations between sociology and social policy have been attended to seriously, what do

these three decades offer us? Certainly, there has been a massive increase in the extent of social research directed toward policy and practical ends.

On the other hand such research has increasingly been undertaken by others rather than by sociologists. Whereas Abrams saw this as one main line of specifically sociology work, and assumed that this type of research would be handled in the main by sociologists and under sociology's methodological (which includes theoretical) rubric. And even to the extent that sociologists have been involved in policy research they have done so, I think, reluctantly, tentatively, apologetically, as a side-line, moonlighting from their real work, less than fully constructively, much less than fully effectively. All this notwithstanding important changes in the range of employment roles of sociologists, and fundamental organisational innovations which have produced a range of research institutes, inside of and outside of the institutions of higher education where the primary expansion of the discipline has happened.

During the same period, and particularly since the end of the sixties, the methodological and the political grounds for the faith in objectivity which underlies Abrams' position have been, apparently, substantially eroded. I see three important influences at work in this:

1. The increasing influence of marxism (or marxisms), the radicalization of sociologists, and consequent general scepticism about involvement in policy work.⁷
2. Reluctant acknowledgement, in the face of attempts at policy work, of the complexities of relations between knowledge and action.⁸
3. The development of a powerful and influential critique of the methodological axioms and ground rules which sociological research for policy goals requires. This is grounded particularly in the work of Cicourel, of ethnomethodologists and phenomenologists separately and together, and of some sorts of marxists. A fundamental dimension of this critical stance is scepticism about statistics, about generalized social categories, about structuralist explanations which ignore intending actors' meanings, and at bottom about "facts".⁹

Of course the history of relations between sociology and policy research during this period is not adequately represented by a simple steeply diving curve from commitment to disillusionment. There have been important fluctuations overall related to changes in governmental regimes. Developments in some specific spheres have been stronger than in others.

Nevertheless it is undeniable that the present represents a gross contrast with the earlier positive hopefulness, both of sociologists and of the public, about the contributions which sociological research and knowledge could make to social development. Now, I believe, is the right and necessary time for a restatement, which takes account of the critique developed in the interim, of Abrams' programme for a substantial involvement by sociologists in policy work.

POLICY

I shall define *policy* for my purpose in the following terms: *a statement, agreed by all relevant parties, of objectives, and of methods of implementing and evaluating them, for*

which adequate resources, including appropriate manpower, have been made available.

I shall assume both that only organisations have policies; and that all organisations either have policies or become "disorganised" and ineffective.¹⁰ This assumption is important because it grounds policy analysis firmly and ineluctably where it belongs in organisational analysis.

The recent expansion of involvement by sociologists in policy and programme evaluation¹¹ ought, in my opinion, to be followed up into feedback, policy reformulation, and implementation. I shall try to show later that this is not a utopian or imperialistic programme; and indeed that much scepticism among sociologists about involvement in policy work arises from *their own* unwillingness to be involved in the policy process in its entirety, which itself (our unwillingness) arises from tendencies towards utopian and imperialistic conceptions of the sociologist's proper role. Policy involvement has to consist of something quite different from merely criticizing existing policy, and impatiently proffering unrealistic alternatives.

Given my understanding of sociological research, and my historical framework and definition of policy, we have the text for a positive programme:

Systematic empirical sociological research has a necessary, important, and constructive role to play in relation to policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation.

Formulated thus, it seems a harmless enough proposition, even anodyne. *My contention is that it has been, and is being, ignored in practice.*

That is to say, on the one hand, very little of the policy work even of large-scale organisations does take account properly of sociological investigation; and, on the other hand, none but a few individual sociologists, nor many research organisations, nor certainly the profession collectively, address themselves coherently and systematically, save at best as a minor secondary task, to research which could properly assist in the policy work of large-scale organisations.

Strengthened in their intellectual Luddism by a philistine governing élite, a politically ignorant élite of sociologists insists on keeping the discipline at arms' length from the real world of policy and action — *except where it can claim a controlling influence.* We prefer to shout or hiss from the sidelines rather than get involved and risk getting dirty, to remain securely confident of victory in academe, rather than to run the risk of losing out at all to other quite proper partners in the policy process.

WARNINGS AND QUERIES ABOUT ORGANIZATIONS

1. Many organisations do not have explicit policies.
2. In many organisations policies are left inexplicit for good organisational reasons and their explication would be resisted.
3. In very few organisations where policy is apparently explicit would their policies answer the strong criteria of my definition. In particular, policy formation is rarely allowed to wait on agreement by all relevant parties; i.e. policy formulation tends to be either authorita-

rian or manipulative. Again, remarkably few policies limit themselves realistically to available resources and skills; i.e. too much policy is just talk, a product of concession to external pressures, and as such it contains its own rationalisation for anticipated failure.

4. Even where proper explicit policies are formulated, policy implementation is commonly either haphazard or authoritarian, right down the line. Accountability is unclear, authority is weak, practical intelligence and commitment are too often low; i.e. on this pessimistic analysis, the organisations, which do the work where policy bites, are generally so ineffective that a rational-empirical analysis, by the management consultant, the operational researcher, the economist, let alone the sociologist, is likely to be resisted.
5. Even in relatively effectively operating organisations, with proper explicit policies, there are very few cases, I believe, where any systematic evaluation is done.

Evaluation in terms of profit and the market is inadequate in itself. Financial cost criteria of evaluation are crude and easily manipulable. Cost-benefit analysis seems to have gone out of favour, partly, I think, because so much of its data was fictional, and took so little account of actual people's wishes, feelings, reactions, activities, lives. Indeed only perhaps in market research for the sellers of goods and some services, and opinion-polling for political parties and some limited aspects of local planning, does real evaluation get much of a showing.¹⁴

We might ask, in relation to what policies has systematic research been done which examines whether or not the objectives have been achieved, whether the methods used have been optimally effective, and what the effects of the effective achievement of objectives have been?

Rather the general case is that people plod on with a policy until a new one appears for no good reason, or until resistance demands a new policy. Whereupon someone can be guaranteed to prove either that the old policy didn't work, and the new one will, or vice-versa, or quite commonly both. Policy evaluation is in its infancy, and what it demands in the way of theory and technology from sociology has hardly even been imagined yet.¹⁵

6. Finally, in this first set of warnings, even given good policy, effective implementation and systematic evaluation, the process of feed-back, which should lead to rational modification of policy, is generally more amateur and more commonly resisted even than evaluation. The only good evaluation it appears, is - a good evaluation. The development of procedures and institutions for correcting mistakes is hardly more advanced than Chinese politics - violent swings of fashionable pendula, inertia, policy hunches, individuals scapegoated, and so on.

Now of course, the average sociologist in the street might easily, indeed gleefully, accept these warnings. From our sociological infancy, fed with nourishment equally if in distinctly different ways by Marx, by Weber, and by Durkheim, we are led to expect an organization to be an irrational mess, and a bodge-up to cover political pickings.

We *take it for granted* that a policy is a phoney cover-up for something or other. We *assume* that policy makers are either knaves or fools or helpless victims of irresistible pressures. If the sociological perspective has achieved any singular meaning it is that the world needs debunking. If the social world as a whole is fit subject for debunking, none more than organizational leaders in their role as spokesmen for policy put themselves in the way of sociological de-mythification.¹⁶

My initial analysis runs counter to all this. It assumes that organizations have specific and accountable social functions beyond survival or job-provision: that organizations must have coherent policies which are more than symbol and slogan: that policies require effective implementation, and that effective policy implementation is both feasible and recognizable: that policy formulation and implementation can be objectively evaluated, even in the midst of political complexity and pressure: that policy can be modified, despite inertia and vested interests: and that in all this sociological knowledge has an essential part to play.

I rather think myself that if policy makers and organizational leadership believed we believed this, we would get a chance to try. But mostly they know that sociologists *don't* believe this. They *know* we are debunkers, critics, anti-organizational men, scoffers at policy, saboteurs.

So much so that the two now orthodox lines on organization and policy are such as to logically prohibit any serious involvement by sociologists in policy work:

- (a) *Varieties of marxist and other conflict theory approaches.*
- (b) *Varieties of phenomenological and ethnomethodological approaches.*¹⁷

The former knows beforehand what the proper policies should be, and limits its analysis of organizational policies to subsumption into a general analysis in terms of class interests and power, and to finding examples which fit its general analysis. This is now so "orthodox" it gets taught at A level even by anti-marxist or un-marxist sociologists without realizing.

The latter, which is newer and has a lot of mileage yet, knows a priori that categories like "organization" and "policy" are actors' concepts, not sociologists'. It contents itself with showing that organizations are sets of individuals somehow more or less coping, managing to manage, surviving, day by day bringing off performances of satisfactory routines in changing situations for different audiences, and that policies are some of the sets of words people use when they are helpful towards their getting by.

These are caricatures, of course, but even thus caricatured, these approaches contain important elements of truth which should stand as warning to any naive and hopeful follower of Abrams.

WARNINGS AND QUERIES ABOUT SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

Even if my first set of warnings and queries could be answered by demonstrating that policy matters, that the policy process requires and allows scope for the application of knowledge, that the organizations which do the work of policy are proper arenas also for sociological work, and

that sociologists have an indispensable contribution to make - even then there would remain a distinct set of difficulties and queries, about sociological knowledge. For the Puritans among sociologists:

- (a) Sociology must define its own questions. Without a primacy of attention to theory, the identity of the discipline will be dissipated. All policy work is a distraction from theory.
- (b) Policy-relevant questions are by definition sociologically trivial and leave the real questions untouched, to be treated as unproblematical axioms.
- (c) Sociologists have no power, and can ipso facto have no influence. Any apparent influence is a deception.
- (d) Involvement in policy work is morally and ethically risky.
- (e) The programme envisaged makes naive assumptions about objectivity, and more generally about the nature of knowledge and its use. Policy sociology is bound in practice to be cosmetic and conservative.
- (f) The programme makes naive assumptions about politics. Even if objective knowledge, by methodological criteria, were feasible, it would be usable only in an idealized social democracy of activated, equal citizens with consensus established on all but details.

In conjunction these make a very powerful critique of the feasibility of any positive programme of involvement of sociology in policy work.

Applied work in sociology has too often and too easily lost sight of the fundamental issues which it is the specific responsibility of sociologists to illuminate and elucidate. Sociologists like John Rex have played and must continue to play an indispensable role in recalling the discipline to its primary tasks.¹⁸ Even if project Camelot demonstrates by the extent of its over-citation that corrupt incorporation of weak sociologists is rarer than some think; and even if the case of Warwick University is, despite the belief of some, strictly irrelevant to this issue, it is nevertheless beyond dispute that as presently organized, given our present puritanical self-conceptions, and given our reluctance to behave like people as well as sociologists, we are weak in the face of all sorts of power groups. Apt in consequence to lose any heavy tackle, we are perhaps wise to weave and dodge.¹⁹

Even if relativistic epistemologies are at least as destructive of any purist sociology as they are of policy oriented analysis, it has to be admitted there are difficult philosophical issues which are commonly neglected in applied sociology.²⁰ Who would doubt (certainly Abrams would not) that policy work in sociology even more than other sociological work is done in an irredeemably political context? Power is not a fact that should be, or can be, ignored.

POSITIVE PROPOSITIONS

As never before, society demonstrably needs, and actually wants — since its spokesmen in every sphere say so — information about itself. We might argue about whether this is a function of complexity and a sign of correlative societal sophistication (as I believe), or a mark of decadent weakness and faltering leadership. What matters is the fact of need and demand for knowledge. Moreover, despite

what ethnomethodologists might have to say about the need in any sort of social situation for self-accounting, or what marxists might urge about the specifically ideological meaning of, and therefore arbitrary limitations on, the knowledge demanded, this need and demand for self-knowledge is, in by belief, different in order and validity than any except modernized societies have ever expressed.

Secondly, the information needed is (to a significant degree) specifically sociological knowledge. The cutting edge of this proposition is, in a sense, its negative element from a sociological point of view. What it says is that only some of the needed information is sociological knowledge. It resists the characteristic sociological imperialism of the past twenty years, which assumes that sociology has a licence to ex cathedra authority all over the place, and asserts that the forces sociology deals in are the only ones that count. That is to say it leaves room, and insists on room, for economic knowledge, for psychological knowledge, for common-sense every day non-disciplinary knowledge, and for philosophy and moral decision making. But on the positive side it asserts that a part of the information needed is only properly discoverable and storable if it is encompassed within sociology's theoretical framework and, therefore, provided by sociologists. We fight this battle every time we speak to someone not a sociologist. I believe that since the case is true, the argument will be won. But it will only be won gradually, diplomatically, modestly, and on condition that we produce the goods.

Thirdly, among the several uses to which sociological knowledge is and will be increasingly put, social policy work is far from the least important. This of course if formulated modestly. I think that the use of sociological knowledge in the entire social policy process, as I have earlier characterized it, is more important than at least some other uses of sociological knowledge, for example than its use in general undergraduate education, or than its use in training for "people professions" such as medicine or social work or teaching, or certainly than its use in general intellectual illumination.²²

It has this importance at this time because of the nature of the stage of development modern society is at. Call it the crisis of late capitalism if you like, call it the foundational phase of corporatism if you like, call it whatever you like if you like. However it is classified, it is a state and a stage of things when either social policies will take account effectively of relevant sociological knowledge or they are bound to fail. They may fail anyway. But now for the first time and imperatively social policies of all large-scale organizations need sociological knowledge, are dependent on concrete sociological research, must make space for sociologists.

Fourthly, the power and influence sociologists need in order to avoid abuse is there for the taking. Unless one believes that all power grows out of the barrel of a gun or springs only from behind a class barricade, this follows from the first three propositions. It follows however only on certain conditions, conditions implicit in rejecting a class conception or any even more atavistic conception of power. If sociological knowledge is needed in policy making, and if sociologists provide that knowledge effectively, all that is required beyond that is that sociologists:

- (a) Accept the ground rules of democratic society without hedging.
- (b) Genuinely share in the fundamental objectives of others involved in the policy process.
- (c) Concede that sociological knowledge is only one of many relevant factors in policy work, and not continually wish this weren't the case.
- (d) Be prepared in policy contexts to behave like any other people — to see, that is to say, that other factors besides logic and truth are normally and inevitably relevant to what gets decided and what gets done.
- (e) Organize ourselves in our departments, in our institutes, and as a profession, at least other than exclusively oppositionally. To orient ourselves *much* more than has been done in each of these arenas to policy work, and to sell ourselves in that posture, will not lead to weakness, but on the contrary to strength, both in simple union terms and in terms of rational influence on society. On this basis we should make claims much more boldly than has ever happened yet to advisory and employment roles in all sorts of large-scale organizations, and inside them to participation in the policy process.

I think this can be classified as a conservative policy *only* on the basis of an assumption that the only proper role for sociologists in the policy process is to control it. Only the fantasy of total power prevents sociology at this time from being given the influence it deserves and needs.

Finally, in relation to social policy the sociological research role is too narrowly defined and should be broadened. So long as sociologists are content to begin their research involvement with policy by accepting a (negotiated) set of terms of conditions and objectives and some money, and to conclude it by providing a report of findings, or at most a set of recommendations, so long will the difficulties I have itemized earlier (*a* to *f*) persist. They will only be resolved effectively to the extent that sociologists, *qua sociologists*, get involved much more deeply, in a multiplicity of roles, in all stages of the policy process.

One useful account of how this can happen has been given by David Uzzell in an exploration of the roles of the community researcher.²³ I have my difficulties with his argument, in particular with his apparent need to denigrate “straight” research in order to speak up for alternatives. But it is an interesting and relevant analysis of the researcher's role, *qua researcher*, as a *change agent*, as a *broker*, and as an *educator*, and of the kinds of identity and behaviour which these roles require. The work some of my colleagues at Brunel do through the method of social analysis seems to me also helpfully relevant, particularly in its focus on the extent and type of inclusion of the researcher in membership of the organization worked with, and in its demonstration of the potential influence of the sociologist.²⁴

I think we shall have to expect and to work towards seeing sociologists from academic departments and research institutes involved with organizations throughout the whole policy process, and through several cycles of it: seeing sociologists employed as sociologists in many roles besides research roles in all sorts of organizations: seeing such sociologists fully involved in the policy process as sociologists: seeing sociologists of different persuasions and


complexions *arguing with each other publicly* in the formal and informal meetings where policy work is done: seeing sociologists looked to for authoritative guidance on sociological issues in at least as many situations as at present economists expect to be looked to for guidance on economic matters.

WHY NOT?

My argument is that since Abrams' book there has been a substantial withdrawal by sociologists from positive involvement through research in the social policy process, that this withdrawal is not rationally justifiable, and that the commitment he expressed to such involvement should be renewed and strengthened. Why not? Why withdraw from the human part of ourselves into a marxist quietism secluded in the library away even from empirical work, or into an ethnomethodological disdain which restricts its data to texts and talk reduced to texts? Abrams' emphasis on the survey at least kept sociologists in the way of people. And all the difficulties of survey work — acknowledged long before Cicourel made such a mountainous molehill of them — lead, if one faces up to them systematically, towards closer involvement by sociologists in the issues we explore, and ultimately, since we are concerned with important issues rather than trivial ones, towards full involvement professionally, *qua sociologists*, in the policy process itself.

Such involvement will, of course, inevitably have effects on our theory work. *It needs it.* It will also demand clarification by sociologists, one by one and each by each, of our political and moral positions. *We need it.*

The fact that our theory does indeed stand in need of radical re-appraisal, and that our political and moral assumptions stand in need of a thoroughgoing overhaul is all too apparent to the public and the powers. Until, as a discipline, we undertake these difficult tasks there will be no improvement in our public reputation, no guarantee that our resources will not be cut back even more savagely, and no proper scope for us to fulfil our responsibilities in the development of our society. I believe we must begin on these tasks by getting actively and realistically involved in the mundane world of the policy process and of everyday social practice.



FOOTNOTES

1. P. Abrams et al. ed., *Practice and Progress: British Sociology, 1950-1980*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1981.
2. D. Marsland, *Seeds of Bankruptcy: Sociological Bias Against Business*, Claridge Press, London, 1988.
3. G. Payne et al., *Sociology and Social Research*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981.
4. M. Bulmer, *Social Policy Research*, Macmillan, London, 1978; and *The Uses of Social Research*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1982. For marxist influences in social policy and social administration, see for example R. Mishra, *Society and Social Policy*, Macmillan, London, 1977; N. Timms ed., *Social Welfare, Why and How?*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980; and P. Taylor-Gooby and J. Dale, *Social Theory and Social Welfare*, Arnold, London, 1981. For a critique of the orthodox involvement of social scientists such as Titmuss and Townsend in social policy see A. Seldon, *Wither The Welfare State*, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1981.
5. Mark Abrams, *Social Surveys and Social Action*, Heinemann, London, 1951.
6. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology*, Free Press, Glencoe, USA, 1960.
7. Even the gradual extension of de-stalinization from the merely institutional sphere to individual consciousness leaves most marxists reluctant collaborators with "capitalism", or any of its organs. Logically, even in the phase of so-called Euro-Communism, only a critical role, and that only in a specific and limited sense, is available to the marxist.
8. Best expressed by P. Marris and M. Rein in *Dilemmas of Social Reform*, Routledge, London, 1967. See also M. Bulmer, op. cit. The difficulties have come out very clearly in two of the most ambitious British attempts at bringing action and research together, in the E.P.A. and the C.D.P. schemes. For example A. H. Halsey, *Educational Priority*, HMSO, London, 1972, and R. Lees and G. Smith, *Action Research in Community Development*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975.
9. A. V. Cicourel, *Method and Measurement in Sociology*, Collier-Macmillan, London, 1964. By categorizing this critique as "powerful and influential", I do not of course imply that it is valid or even plausible. In fact I think it is neither. See "On method in sociology", chapter 15 in my *Sociological Explorations in the Service of Youth*, National Youth Bureau, Leicester, 1978, for a modest contribution to what promises to be a "positivist backlash". Fruitful examples of the reaction against arbitrary relativism are provided by the chapters by Jennifer Platt and Maureen Cain in P. Abrams et al. eds., *Practice and Progress*, op. cit.
10. This is not to imply that having a policy guarantees effectiveness. There are straightforward "bad" policies, and external circumstance can turn a "good" policy into a "bad" one too quickly to allow for adaptation. There is also implementation. And luck.
11. No doubt this is to some large degree a product merely of recession (or crisis). But it is also, I believe, a structural phase in the development of the social use of social knowledge, and in social development at the societal level.
12. Recent analysis of this matter (Martin Bulmer ed., *Social Policy Research*, Macmillan, London, 1978) seems to confirm this judgement. I agree with J. P. Martin's diagnosis (in a review in T.H.E.S., December 1st, 1978) of the book's "underlying pessimism". See also G. Payne et al., op. cit., and M. Bulmer's more recent work, op. cit.
13. I assume it does not need emphasizing that this classification of some sociologists as politically ignorant is entirely dependent on the concept of politics implicit in my analysis of policy. It cannot, I think, be argued that this concept excludes power. It does discount as ignorant any approach which treats the pursuit or retention of power as the exclusive or even primary objective of policy.
14. This is not to say that I do not acknowledge the difficulties faced by and the weaknesses persisting in market research and opinion polling. But my judgement is that both difficulties and weaknesses are commonly exaggerated by sociologists. This does not seem to stop us using their findings when they seem helpful to an argument we want to make.
15. The situation in the United States is, within the framework of my analysis, much stronger. See, for example, the *Handbook of Evaluation Research* (ed. E. L. Struening and M. Guthen-tag, 1975), *Social Policy and Sociology* (ed. N. J. Demerath et al, 1975) or P. H. Rossi and E. Freeman, *Evaluation: A Systematic Approach*, Sage, London, 1982, for evidence of the scale and (technical, theoretical, and political) sophistication of U.S. work.
16. The charge of mystification is mutual, as the sociologically acute cartoon, reproduced on the previous page, indicates (*Evening Standard*, December 19, 1978).
17. Both these lines of analysis conspire in the J. B. McKinlay ed., *Processing People: Cases in Organizational Behaviour*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, London, 1975. An early and influential conjunction of these perspectives on organization which seem to me to preclude serious involvement by sociologists in policy work is David Silverman's *The Theory of Organisations*, Heineman, London, 1970.
18. John Rex, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964, and *Sociology and the Demystification of the Modern World*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974. I have contributed to this same task within a limited sphere in examining the weaknesses of "youth studies" as a field of knowledge and demonstrating the necessity of a specifically sociological analysis of youth ("Sociology of youth as an area of study", chapter 7 in Marsland, op. cit.). Sociological analysis, however, must be compatible at least some of the time with practical concerns about the properly sociological dimension of things.
Much of the British literature of social policy is, due to specialist development of social administration, specifically unsociological, even the best of it, for example Joyce Warham's *Social Policy in Context*, Batsford, London, 1970. More recent work, such as P. Hall et al., *Change, Choice, and Conflict in Social Policy*, Heineman, London, 1978, seems to me liable to overcorrection and to represent a shift towards a conventional version of a merely critical sociology. See note 4 above.
19. I. L. Horowitz, *Project Camelot*, Transaction, November 1965; E. P. Thompson, *Warwick University Ltd.*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1970.
20. This admission does nothing to lessen my personal conviction that much of the influential relativising analysis, whether marxist or phenomenological, is based on second-hand and second-rate philosophy. Better if Popper had been read before he was rejected.
21. Of course the concept 'modernized society' begs a host of questions. I am content for now not only to leave them begged, but to raise the order of begging considerably by defining a modernised society as one "which institutionally allows to sociologists a real authority to seek, on behalf of society, answers to questions about society." More seriously I use the term as Parsons uses it and believe his analysis is adequate. In a proper analysis of "modernised society" I assume liberal democratic institutions, free economic institutions, and an effective legal system are central.
22. This is a partial reference to Parsons' classification of types of functions of the university. T. Parsons and G. Platt, *The American University*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1973. My analysis implicitly defines post-graduate education and training in sociology — our weakest sphere — as very important indeed. Hence the crucial importance of the recent and on-going dispute about the S.S.R.C. and the E.S.R.C.
23. David Uzzell, "Four roles for the community researcher", A.V.A.S. Seminar, 9th World Congress of I.S.A., Uppsala, 1978.
24. In the Institute of Organisation and Social Studies. R. Rowbottom, *Social Analysis*, Heineman, London, 1977; also D. Marsland, "Methodological Inadequacies in British Social Science", chapter in S. Cang, ed., *Festschrift for Elliott Jaques*, Cason-Hall, Washington DC, 1992.