Earlier today, “Kevin” left this comment on the Libertarian Alliance Blog:

Britain did not, in fact, launch the strategic bombing of civilians in World War II. In Europe, Germany was the first country to engage in such bombing—first in Guernica (1937), then Warsaw (1939), then London (August 24, 1940).

He was responding to Kevin Duffy’s long article on what Murray Rothbard would think of the Israeli attack on Gaza, and his comment is at a tangent to this. However, his comment is worth a formal response.

It is a persistent claim, often repeated in print and online, that Britain bore no responsibility for launching the strategic bombing of civilians in the Second World War. This is, at best, a misleading summary of events. It contains partial truths, but the overall impression it creates—that Germany began the mutual civilian bombing campaign and Britain merely responded—is historically inaccurate. The record, when read in full, shows that Britain was the first to launch a deliberate strategic bombing raid against civilian targets in the enemy homeland during the Second World War. The German Blitz was a reaction, not a provocation.

Let us begin with Guernica. The Luftwaffe’s bombing of this Basque town in April 1937, commemorated in Picasso’s painting, was undoubtedly horrifying. But it took place during the Spanish Civil War, not the Second World War. The attack was carried out by Germany’s Condor Legion in support of Franco’s Nationalists and does not belong chronologically or juridically to the global conflict that broke out in September 1939. It is therefore irrelevant to any claim about who started the bombing of civilians in World War II.

A more relevant milestone is the bombing of Warsaw in September 1939, when the German Luftwaffe devastated large parts of the Polish capital. This, however, was part of a combined operation during the invasion of Poland. Though the civilian toll was terrible, the bombing was not aimed at the German equivalent of ‘strategic’ ends—namely, the demoralisation of a civilian population at home to hasten the end of a war. It was part of a broader military campaign and, by the standards of the time, not unprecedented.

Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939. In the early months of the war—the so-called “Phoney War”—neither side made significant bombing raids against the other’s civilian population. Indeed, the Germans refrained from bombing British cities, partly from moral hesitation and partly because Hitler still hoped for peace with Britain. German attacks, where they occurred, were mostly aimed at naval or military targets.

Matters changed during the Battle of Britain in mid-1940. The Luftwaffe began by attacking RAF airfields and radar installations in preparation for a possible invasion. This campaign—though brutal—was still focused on military infrastructure. On 24 August 1940, however, a small group of German bombers accidentally dropped their payload on central London, causing civilian casualties. The bombing was unauthorised and contrary to standing orders.

It was this incident that Churchill seized upon as justification for a bombing raid on Berlin. The very next night, 25 August 1940, RAF Bomber Command launched the first raid on the German capital, dropping bombs that killed at least ten civilians and injured many more. Though the damage was militarily insignificant, the symbolism was enormous. It shattered the illusion of German invulnerability and deeply humiliated the Nazi leadership.

In response to this, Hitler ordered the sustained bombing of British cities, beginning with London on 7 September 1940—the opening of what became known as the Blitz. For eight months, German bombers struck at British urban centres, causing tens of thousands of deaths. But the cause-and-effect relationship is clear: it was the RAF’s bombing of Berlin—however modest in scope—that prompted the German shift to urban terror bombing in Britain. Before that, the Luftwaffe had held back.

Moreover, the British bombing of Berlin was not a one-off. It marked the beginning of a new strategic direction for RAF Bomber Command. Even in 1940, and increasingly under Air Marshal Arthur “Bomber” Harris, the RAF adopted a doctrine of area bombing—the deliberate targeting of civilian areas to undermine morale and cripple industrial capacity. This strategy, publicly justified as a blow against war-making potential, was in practice an effort to terrorise the German population into submission.

The full scale of this policy became apparent in 1942–45, with the firebombing of Hamburg, Cologne, Dresden, and other cities. Harris, in fact, rejected the idea of “precision” bombing altogether. In one of his famous memoranda, he wrote:

“The aim is to make the enemy burn and bleed in every way possible… The destruction of German cities will shorten the war.”

By contrast, while the Germans did engage in strategic bombing—especially against London, Coventry, and other cities—this was a response rather than a prelude. Their early-war doctrine lacked the emphasis on long-range civilian terror bombing that would come to define Allied strategy. It is also worth noting that German bombing was mostly by twin-engine medium bombers with relatively light payloads. The RAF and USAAF later fielded much heavier aircraft capable of far greater destruction.

In summary:

• Germany bombed civilian targets first (Warsaw, 1939), but during an invasion campaign.
• Germany accidentally bombed London first (24 August 1940).
• Britain deliberately bombed Berlin first (25 August 1940).
• The Blitz was a direct response to Britain’s Berlin raid.
• Britain was the first to formalise a policy of strategic bombing of civilians in the enemy homeland.

The narrative that Germany began the bombing of civilians and Britain merely responded is therefore factually inaccurate. It misrepresents both the timeline and the nature of strategic decisions taken by both sides. One may debate the morality or military value of such bombing campaigns, but the facts are clear: Britain began the deliberate bombing of civilians in enemy cities during World War II, and Germany’s Blitz was a retaliation. After nearly a hundred years—and bearing in mind that both Britain and Germany would now be more recognisably Britain and Germany had each agreed in September 1939 to peace on terms favourable to the other following the toss of a coin—we should try to put aside the propaganda that kept each side hating each other and fighting in the 1940s.

Extended Reading List: Strategic Bombing in World War II

General Works and Overviews

• Overy, Richard. The Bombing War: Europe 1939–1945. London: Allen Lane, 2013.
  — The definitive one-volume history of aerial bombing in Europe. Rich in detail, wide-ranging in scope, and meticulous in separating propaganda from fact.
• Biddle, Tami Davis. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
  — An essential academic study tracing how bombing theory developed from pre-war idealism to wartime brutality. Very strong on British policy formation.
• Hastings, Max. Bomber Command. London: Michael Joseph, 1979.
  — Still a powerful, if somewhat polemical, account of the British bombing offensive. Critical of the morality and utility of area bombing, especially under Harris.
• Grayling, A. C. Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in WWII a War Crime? London: Bloomsbury, 2006.
  — A philosophical and historical inquiry into the ethics of area bombing. Argues controversially that some Allied actions approached criminality.
• Murray, Williamson. Luftwaffe. Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing, 1985.
  — A detailed operational history of the German air force, including its doctrine, strategic bombing capacity, and weaknesses.
• Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. London: Pimlico, 1995.
  — Contains important chapters on strategic bombing, with a nuanced view of its contributions to Allied victory.
• Messenger, Charles. The Commandos: 1940–1946. London: William Kimber, 1985.
  — Though not focused on bombing, this contextualises British offensive strategy in early WWII, which is crucial to understanding Churchill’s posture.

British Strategy, Doctrine, and Command

• Harris, Arthur. Bomber Offensive. London: Collins, 1947.
  — The official memoir of Air Chief Marshal “Bomber” Harris. Defends the area bombing strategy unapologetically and offers valuable insight into how the RAF saw its mission.
• Webster, Charles, and Noble Frankland. The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939–1945. 4 vols. London: HMSO, 1961.
  — The official British government history of the bombing campaign. Comprehensive, scrupulously documented, and indispensable.
• Probert, Henry. Bomber Harris: His Life and Times. London: Greenhill, 2001.
  — A more sympathetic biography of Harris, written by an RAF insider, but based on serious research.
• Terraine, John. The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939–1945. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1985.
  — An RAF-centred narrative that places the bombing campaign within the broader framework of British air strategy.

German Perspectives and Bombing Policy

• Boog, Horst, ed. The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War: An International Comparison. Oxford: Berg, 1992.
  — A translated selection from the German Germany and the Second World War series. Excellent on Luftwaffe doctrine and strategic failures.
• Boog, Horst. Strategic Air and Air Defence Warfare. Vol. 7 in Germany and the Second World War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.
  — Authoritative coverage of Germany’s approach to bombing, air defence, and civil defence. Deep archival basis.
• Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy. London: Allen Lane, 2006.
  — While not a book on bombing per se, it shows how bombing shaped the German war economy and contributes context to the effects of Allied attacks.
• Taylor, Frederick. Dresden: Tuesday, 13 February 1945. London: Bloomsbury, 2004.
  — A balanced account of the bombing of Dresden, using German and British sources. Refutes some exaggerations but acknowledges the scale of destruction.

Moral, Legal, and Theoretical Debates

• Todman, Dan. Britain’s War: Into Battle, 1937–1941. London: Allen Lane, 2016.
  — Covers the early war period, including Churchill’s strategic mindset and the decision to bomb Berlin.
• Neillands, Robin. The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany. London: John Murray, 2001.
  — A more populist defence of the bombing campaign, challenging what the author sees as excessive revisionism.
• Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
  — A well-researched study of US policy, but with relevance to the wider Allied bombing debate. Includes comparative material.
• Lindqvist, Sven. A History of Bombing. Translated by Linda Haverty Rugg. London: Granta, 2001.
  — A fragmented, polemical, but often brilliant book linking early 20th-century aerial warfare to colonialism, Guernica, and beyond.

Primary Sources and Documents

• Churchill, Winston. The Second World War. 6 vols. London: Cassell, 1948–54.
  — Churchill’s war memoirs, full of self-justifying prose but essential for understanding his rationale in escalating the bombing campaign.
• Hansard Parliamentary Debates (UK), 1940–45.
  — Parliamentary debates on the bombing campaign, defence policy, and civilian morale. Particularly worth searching for questions on reprisals and ethics.
• RAF Bomber Command Operational Record Books (National Archives, Kew).
  — Day-by-day records of missions, targets, weather, and results. Invaluable for the serious researcher.

Image: Bodies in Dresden awaiting cremation; from Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-08778-0001 / Hahn / CC-BY-SA 3.0, CC BY-SA 3.0 de, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5420481)