Paul Goodman has two claims to distinction. The first is that he was at York with Dr Gabb. The second is that he is one of the few Conservative politicians to have resigned from Parliament without first having been caught in bed with a live boy, a dead woman, or a suitcase of foreign cash. A third claim is that, since he resigned in 2010, and therefore had no part in the subsequent gross and systematic betrayal of the country by his fellow Conservatives, his name can be omitted from the Act of Attainder by which the relevant persons will eventually be punished.

There, however, is an end to his claim. Though an honest man, Mr Goodman is making an argument that is yet more Conservative propaganda.

His thesis, published in The Daily Telegraph under the title “It’s not the Conservatives who have most to fear from Reform – it’s Labour. Here’s why,” is that Reform, despite its stated mission to replace the Conservatives, is in fact more damaging to Labour. He bases this claim on a series of projections and by-elections that, he argues, show Reform taking votes from Labour rather than the Conservatives. This conclusion, however, is deeply flawed, resting on cherry-picked data and a wilful refusal to engage with the underlying realities of Britain’s shifting political landscape.

The Conservative Exodus to Reform

One of Mr Goodman’s central claims is that Reform’s rise is drawing more support from Labour than from the Conservatives. Yet he conveniently ignores the steady and well-documented exodus of Conservative members and voters to Reform. This shift is not an abstract trend but a direct consequence of the Conservative Party’s abandonment of its base. Over fourteen years of government, the Conservatives have broken nearly every promise they made to their voters. They pledged to reduce immigration; it soared to record levels. They promised to slash taxes; instead, they presided over the highest tax burden in seventy years. They vowed to restore Britain’s sovereignty, yet they have allowed the civil service, judiciary, and foreign organisations to undermine every meaningful attempt at reform.

Reform’s appeal lies precisely in its recognition of these failures. Nigel Farage has built his party on the discontent of those who once supported the Conservatives but now see them as part of the problem. These are not isolated anecdotes but part of a broader realignment. The Conservative membership rolls have shrunk dramatically, with many defecting to Reform or simply giving up in despair. Polls may show Labour losing some votes to Reform, but this is a secondary phenomenon. The real story is the hollowing out of the Conservative base.

A Snapshot in Time

Mr Goodman’s projections rely on current polling data, as if today’s figures can reliably predict the political landscape of 2029. This is a dubious assumption. Political trends do not move in straight lines, and four years is an eternity in politics. By focusing narrowly on today’s numbers, Mr Goodman ignores the dynamic nature of electoral shifts. Reform is not merely a protest vote; it is a growing movement that has the potential to reshape the Right in Britain. Its current polling figures represent a foundation, not a ceiling.

Moreover, Mr Goodman’s analysis assumes that the Conservative Party will remain a viable electoral force over the next four years. This is far from certain. If the Conservatives continue on their present trajectory, they may find themselves reduced to a rump party, much like the Liberal Democrats after their coalition with David Cameron. Reform, on the other hand, is well-positioned to fill the vacuum left by a collapsing Conservative Party. The projections Mr Goodman cites may soon be rendered irrelevant by the continued erosion of the Conservative vote.

The Myth of Labour’s Vulnerability

Mr Goodman argues that Labour is the real loser in Reform’s rise, pointing to by-election results and a handful of parliamentary constituencies where Reform has performed well. This argument overlooks the structural advantages Labour enjoys under the current electoral system. The distribution of Labour’s vote is far more efficient than that of either the Conservatives or Reform. Even if Reform were to take a significant share of Labour’s vote in certain constituencies, it is unlikely to translate into a substantial loss of seats for Labour.

Furthermore, Mr Goodman’s analysis fails to account for the broader context of Labour’s dominance in urban areas, where Reform has little presence. While Reform may perform well in specific “elastic” seats, these are exceptions rather than the rule. Labour’s core support remains largely intact, insulated from the kind of existential threat that Reform poses to the Conservatives.

Reform’s Strategic Advantage

What Mr Goodman fails to grasp is that Reform’s strategy is not simply to replace Labour or the Conservatives in individual constituencies. Its goal is to fundamentally reshape the political landscape by breaking the duopoly that has dominated British politics for decades. This is not an overnight process but a long-term project. Reform’s rise is not a temporary blip but part of a broader realignment that reflects the disillusionment of millions of voters with the existing political order.

Farage understands that the Conservatives are his primary target, not Labour. His strategy is to position Reform as the true party of the Right, unencumbered by the baggage of fourteen years of failure. By attacking Labour, Reform can broaden its appeal and attract disillusioned voters from across the spectrum. But this is a secondary objective. The ultimate aim is to replace the Conservatives as the dominant force on the Right, and the party’s growing membership and financial resources suggest it is well on its way to achieving this.

The Conservative Party’s Death Spiral

Mr Goodman’s optimism about the Conservative Party’s prospects is deeply misplaced. He clings to the idea that the Conservatives can somehow bounce back from their current predicament, ignoring the systemic failures that have brought them to this point. The party is no longer a credible vehicle for conservative policies. It is a hollow shell, propped up by inertia and the lingering loyalty of a dwindling base.

The Conservative Party’s problems are not merely cyclical; they are existential. Its leadership has alienated its core supporters, failed to deliver on its promises, and embraced policies that are indistinguishable from those of its supposed opponents. In this context, the rise of Reform is not just a challenge to the Conservatives; it is a death knell. The party’s attempts to co-opt Reform or enter into a “reverse takeover” are unlikely to succeed. Farage’s supporters are not interested in saving the Conservatives; they want to replace them.

A Polite but Firm Rebuttal

Mr Goodman’s article is a well-written but ultimately unconvincing defence of a party that has outlived its usefulness. His projections and arguments are based on flawed assumptions and a refusal to engage with the deeper forces driving Britain’s political realignment. Reform is not a threat to Labour; it is an existential challenge to the Conservatives. And if the Conservatives cannot adapt to this new reality, they will go the way of the Whigs and the Liberal Unionists before them.

The political landscape of 2029 will be shaped not by today’s polls but by the decisions made in the years to come. Reform has the momentum, the leadership, and the vision to succeed where the Conservatives have failed. Mr Goodman would do well to acknowledge this reality and spare us the increasingly desperate attempts to argue otherwise.