I have had my attention drawn to an article on the Lew Rockwell site by Brandon Smith. This is a sustained and undoubtedly clever attempt to present the recent American war against Iran and the subsequent peace agreement as a strategic triumph for Donald Trump. Mr Smith argues that most criticism of the agreement is based on misunderstanding or deliberate misrepresentation. He further argues that Mr Trump successfully defeated several hostile factions at once: the neoconservatives, the Israeli lobby, the political left, and various “black-piller” sceptics.

This interpretation deserves careful examination. It is possible that the Memorandum of Understanding represents the least bad outcome available to Washington after entering a conflict it could not sustain. It is also possible that some of Mr Trump’s critics are motivated more by hatred of the man than by any objective assessment of events. At the same time, none of this proves that America won. One of the recurring weaknesses of the article is its tendency to treat the embarrassment of particular factions as evidence of American success. These are not the same thing. A nation can expose the folly of its advisers and still lose a war. It can frustrate the ambitions of one pressure group and still emerge weaker than before.

I therefore propose to examine each major claim in turn. I do this by summarising Mr Smith’s argument, then adding my reply. Before I do so, however, I urge readers to check the original article for themselves. It is possible that I am wrong, or that I have unintentionally misrepresented Mr Smith’s position. I do not believe I am unfair, but I would not wish anyone to judge this reply without reference to the source. A link to the original appears in my first paragraph and is repeated here for convenience.

Claim 1: The Neoconservatives Have Been Defeated

Mr Smith argues that the neoconservative faction, represented by figures such as John Bolton, Lindsey Graham, and Mike Pence, wanted total regime change in Iran, including a possible ground invasion and long-term American occupation. He claims these people are angry because the peace agreement prevents the complete destruction of the Iranian regime and therefore represents a defeat for their agenda.

Reply

This is perhaps the strongest part of Mr Smith’s case. The neoconservative movement has spent decades pushing military adventures that have repeatedly failed to achieve their stated objectives. Iraq was supposed to become a democratic model for the Middle East. Libya was supposed to become a stable liberal state. Afghanistan was supposed to become a showcase of Western nation-building. The actual results scarcely require elaboration.

There is therefore every reason to be pleased when the advocates of endless war are frustrated. Yet frustration of the neoconservatives does not mean American victory. The question is not whether Mr Bolton is disappointed. The relevant question is whether the United States achieved the objectives for which the war was launched. If Washington entered the war hoping to force Iranian capitulation, to secure permanent control of the Strait of Hormuz, to eliminate Iran’s strategic independence, and to dictate the terms of any future settlement, then the available evidence suggests that these objectives were not achieved. The fact that some wanted even more ambitious objectives tells us little.

Indeed, Mr Smith inadvertently highlights the scale of the failure. If the neoconservatives genuinely wanted total occupation and regime change, and if the administration now finds itself accepting Iranian influence in the Gulf and the continuation of the existing regime, then the gap between ambition and outcome is enormous.

Nor does Mr Smith explain why this outcome required a war in the first place. If the purpose was to expose the unreality of neoconservative assumptions, publicity and their removal from positions of influence could have achieved the same result at lower cost. There is a tendency throughout the article to confuse the exposure of bad advice with successful statecraft. They are not the same thing. One can discover that one’s advisers were fools after acting on their advice. The discovery does not undo the consequences.

Claim 2: The Israeli Lobby Has Been Defeated

Mr Smith argues that the Israeli lobby desired the same outcome as the neoconservatives: regime change, occupation, and the permanent destruction of Iran as a regional rival. He argues that the peace agreement therefore represents a major defeat for those interests and a corresponding victory for the Trump administration.

Reply

Again, there is an element of truth in Mr Smith’s description. Israeli governments have long regarded Iran as their principal strategic rival in the region, as the last barrier to their recreation of some fictious empire ruled by King David at the end of the Bronze Age. Many of their supporters in Washington have consistently promoted a policy of maximum pressure. The difficulty is once again the leap from the disappointment of a faction to the victory of a nation. The fact that some Israeli interests may be unhappy with the outcome does not establish that the United States has improved its position. At most, it establishes that one set of expectations has not been fulfilled.

One must also ask whether there was really no alternative means of reducing Israeli influence over American policy. Mr Smith’s argument implies that, as with the associated neoconservatives, the only way to discredit the lobby was first to follow its recommendations and then discover they were unworkable. This resembles a man proving that a bridge is unsafe by driving his car into the river. A wiser course would have been to reject the recommendations before testing them. Even the Biden people managed that much.

The broader problem is that reality has imposed limits on American power. Mr Smith presents this as a triumph over the Israeli lobby. A less charitable interpretation is that events have exposed assumptions shared by both the lobby and the administration itself. I say again; there is a difference between defeating a pressure group and discovering that its advice was unrealistic.

Claim 3: The Political Left Wanted a Quagmire

Mr Smith argues that the American political left wanted a prolonged war because it believed military failure would improve its electoral prospects. He further argues that the left has aligned itself with Islamic interests as part of a broader project against Western civilisation and therefore opposed any successful conclusion to the conflict.

Reply

This claim supposes an independence and strategic coherence to the contemporary left that it has not had in years. There was a time when the left was a genuine challenge to established power. Whether one approved of its objectives or not, the old labour movements at least claimed to organise working people against concentrations of wealth and privilege. Their ambition was class consciousness, their purpose to unite workers across regional, religious and cultural divisions against what they regarded as a common ruling class. That left no longer exists.

The modern left is largely a creation of the same ruling interests it pretends to oppose. Its principal function is not to organise economic resistance but to prevent it. Instead of class, it talks about race. Instead of wages, it talks about identity. Instead of the distribution of wealth, it talks about culture and personal behaviour. Every issue is reframed in a manner that divides ordinary people into smaller and more hostile groups. The result is not solidarity but atomisation. This is not an accidental development. A population fragmented by competing grievances is far easier to manage than a population united by common economic interests. The contemporary left therefore performs a useful function for the ruling class. It channels discontent into disputes that leave the underlying structure of power untouched.

For this reason, Mr Smith exaggerates the significance of defeating these people. If the ruling class decides that certain cultural campaigns have become inconvenient, they will disappear almost overnight. The same newspapers that yesterday celebrated transsexual activists will discover new priorities. The same corporations that covered themselves in rainbow flags will move on to whatever cause better serves their interests. The same universities that built careers around diversity bureaucracies will find new opportunities for moral exhibitionism.

Indeed, this process is already visible. One does not need a war with Iran to defeat the modern left. One does not need military confrontation in the Persian Gulf to reduce the influence of gender activists. All that is required is a change of mind among the people who fund, promote and protect these movements.

Mr Smith therefore confuses two separate questions. The future of identity politics depends on calculations within the Western ruling class. The outcome of a war with Iran depends on military, diplomatic and economic realities. The connection between the two is imaginary. Even if every transsexual activist in America disappeared tomorrow, that would tell us nothing about whether American policy in the Middle East had succeeded. The battlefield remains indifferent to culture-war theatrics. Military success is measured by outcomes, not by the disappointment of activists whom the ruling class has already begun to abandon.

Claim 4: Black-Pillers and Sceptics Were Proven Wrong

Mr Smith criticises what he calls “black-pillers” and liberty-movement commentators who took Iranian statements at face value and predicted WWIII, the collapse of the global economy, the destruction of American naval forces by hypersonic missiles, and a lengthy ground war. He notes that none of these catastrophes occurred and that he himself adjusted his view once a ground invasion was ruled out.

Reply

This section reveals a persistent weakness in the analysis: the conflation of “not descending into total apocalypse” with “victory.” That the conflict did not immediately trigger World War III or sink the entire American fleet is a very low bar. Serious observers warned not of inevitable Armageddon but of high costs and the risk of accelerating America’s relative decline. Those warnings have been largely vindicated.

Mr Smith acknowledges that the war lasted longer than his predicted five weeks. Iran did not fight to the last man, but nor did it collapse. Instead, it inflicted damage on American bases and forced Washington to the negotiating table on terms far more favourable to Tehran than anything contemplated before the conflict. The decision to accept a ceasefire rather than press on was itself an admission that continuing would be more costly than retreating. Surrender chosen as the lesser evil is not the same as triumph.

Claim 5: The Blockade Strategy Was a Masterstroke

Mr Smith claims that Mr Trump’s “blockade of the blockade” strategy successfully strangled Iran’s oil exports and forced negotiations without the need for a ground invasion, thereby saving thousands of lives.

Reply

Negotiations with Iran were already underway before the war began. The conflict was not necessary to bring Tehran to the table; it was launched in the hope of extracting better terms. That hope proved illusory. The Iranians are now in a stronger position than they were at the outset — less isolated, enriched by higher oil prices during the fighting, and able to demand concessions rather than merely accept them. The blockade may have caused temporary pain, but it failed to break Iran’s will or its capacity to retaliate effectively.

Claim 6: The Peace Deal Represents an Undeniable Victory

Mr Smith lists several supposed achievements: destruction of Iranian leadership layers, diminished missile capability, the Strait of Hormuz remaining open without tolls, the end of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme with enriched uranium under international supervision, and the fracturing of OPEC leading to lower global oil prices.

Reply

This section reveals perhaps the greatest misunderstanding in the entire article: the confusion of tactical success with strategic success. Wars are not fought merely to destroy things. They are fought to achieve political objectives. A military operation that kills thousands and demolishes infrastructure can still be a strategic failure if it leaves the enemy stronger than before. The Germans inflicted terrible losses on the Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942. The Americans devastated North Vietnam from the air. Neither campaign achieved its political purpose. The same question must be asked here.

Mr Smith begins with the murder of senior Iranian figures. This was the centrepiece of the original strategy. The war opened with “decapitation strikes” in the apparent belief that the Iranian state would collapse if enough leaders were assassinated. Remove the leadership, sow confusion, encourage factionalism, and watch the regime disintegrate. Instead, the Iranian state survived. Successors emerged rapidly. The Revolutionary Guards consolidated power. Nationalist sentiment intensified. The war produced not regime change, but regime consolidation.

The same problem applies to missile capabilities. Even if stockpiles were depleted, the broader lesson is that Iran possessed enough asymmetric power to inflict substantial costs and disrupt the regional economy.

Mr Smith’s confidence on the nuclear question is equally hard to sustain. American officials repeatedly claimed Iran’s nuclear programme had been “obliterated.” Yet the negotiations themselves show the issue remains live. Moreover, the war has strengthened the case inside Iran for a genuine nuclear deterrent. A conflict launched to prevent proliferation may have made it more likely.

His discussion of OPEC and oil prices reflects the same short-term focus. Weakening OPEC is not automatically an American victory in an era when U.S. power rests on the petrodollar system. That system enabled massive deficits and financialisation while America’s industrial base hollowed out. The war has accelerated moves away from dollar-denominated energy trade. Mr Smith focuses on individual tactical achievements while the larger strategic picture — regime survival, improved Iranian diplomacy, weakened sanctions credibility, and eroding dollar authority — points in the opposite direction.

Claim 7: Iran Receives No Real Concessions

Mr Smith insists that Iran gains nothing of substance in the peace deal. He dismisses the reported $300 billion investment fund as a mere idea on paper, funded by private foreign investors rather than American taxpayers, and fully revocable by the Trump administration if Iran misbehaves. He similarly downplays the unfreezing of Iranian assets as merely returning what already belonged to Iran, with the U.S. holding only a small portion. On the Strait of Hormuz, he denies any agreement to tolls and claims Iran never truly controlled the waterway, as American naval operations allowed tankers through and insurance issues were the real constraint. He adds that the American blockade damaged Iranian oil infrastructure, weakening their long-term position.

Reply

This section is perhaps the weakest part of the article because it requires the reader to ignore the practical consequences of the agreement and focus instead on accounting distinctions that have little relevance to power politics.

The first weakness is the attempt to dismiss the proposed $300 billion reconstruction and development programme on the grounds that the money will not come directly from American taxpayers. This is beside the point. International politics is concerned with outcomes rather than bookkeeping. Whether the money arrives through Gulf sovereign wealth funds, private investors, development banks, or direct government transfers, the effect is the same. Iran emerges from the conflict with access to capital and commercial opportunities that were unavailable before the war. One way or the other, Iran will have its frozen money back, plus reparations for the war. Mr Smith’s dismissal of the possibility of Iranian tolls is beside the point. The point is that the Americans know they must pay for what they have done. If Iran imposes transit tolls on the Straits of Hormuz, the Americans may huff and puff, but doing nothing will be less shameful than handing over lorryloads of cash.

Then there is the destruction of the sanctions regime. For years, American policy rested on the assumption that Iran could be economically isolated and gradually weakened. That assumption has now collapsed. Sanctions work because people fear them. Once enough important actors cease to be afraid, the mechanism begins to fail. Mr Smith writes as though sanctions can simply be switched on and off at will. This misunderstands how credibility operates. A sanctions regime that survives only until the next geopolitical embarrassment is not a powerful instrument. It is an admission of weakness.

The discussion of Hormuz borders on the surreal. Mr Smith insists that Iran never truly controlled the Strait. If traffic through it stopped, that was because of the insurers, not because of Iranian naval power. This distinction is artificial. Power is measured by effects. If Iran was able, whether through military means, political uncertainty, insurance disruption, or the threat of escalation, to reduce traffic through one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints to a fraction of its normal level, then Iran possessed leverage. The fact that the leverage operated through market mechanisms does not make it less real. Quite the opposite: it shows an understanding of modern economic warfare that Washington appears not to have anticipated. Countries needing access to Gulf energy increasingly sought accommodation with Tehran rather than relying on Washington.

Mr Smith’s treatment of Iranian oil infrastructure is equally unconvincing. Temporary damage is possible, but it is outweighed by the strategic gains: regime survival, improved diplomatic standing, weakened sanctions, and accelerated de-dollarisation. The article ignores the wider implications for the international financial order. The petrodollar system has allowed Washington to finance deficits on a scale that would cripple almost any other state. The war has accelerated pressures that were already undermining this arrangement. Mr Smith examines individual trees and assures us that the forest remains unchanged. The difficulty is that the forest appears to be on fire.

Claim 8: The Nuclear Issue and Justification for War

Mr Smith argues that the war was justified because Iran was on the verge of developing nuclear weapons. He cites Iran’s admission of holding significant quantities of 60 per cent enriched uranium, capable of rapid further enrichment, and its improved ballistic missile range. He argues that an authoritarian Islamic regime believing in religious martyrdom cannot be trusted with such weapons, and that Mr Trump was right to act. Under the deal, the Americans and IAEA will supposedly supervise the dilution and removal of this material.

Reply

The moral and strategic foundation of this argument is weak. Many regimes of varying unpleasantness possess nuclear weapons without triggering American military action. The question of whether Iran “should” be allowed such capabilities is secondary to the practical one: has American policy enhanced or diminished its ability to influence this outcome?

Prior to the war, Iran was already negotiating. The conflict has given it both greater motivation and stronger international sympathy for developing a deterrent. Claims of American control over the uranium stockpile appear overstated; reports of Iranian resilience and restocking capacity suggest otherwise. Sovereign states have every right to resist foreign vetoes over their defensive research, particularly after experiencing direct attack.

Iran has demonstrated notable restraint since 1979 and during this conflict. It could have inflicted far greater damage — for instance, by targeting Gulf desalination plants — but chose calculated responses aimed at long-term advantage. This is the behaviour of a rational state actor, not an apocalyptic death cult. The war has, if anything, made a nuclear Iran more rather than less likely.

Claim 9: Propaganda and Overall Success

Mr Smith credits Iran with effective use of social media, possibly aided by Russia and China, while criticising the Trump administration for falling behind in counter-propaganda. He notes that Mr Trump’s political base remained intact, that Russian and Chinese weapons proved largely ineffective, and that the blockade succeeded without a ground war. Overall, he concludes that Mr Trump secured his objectives, Iran gained nothing permanent, and the deal can be reversed if necessary. This, he says, is a resounding success.

Reply

This final section reveals the central weakness not merely of this part of the article, but of the article as a whole. Throughout his discussion, Mr Smith repeatedly redefines American objectives in order to preserve the appearance of success. The war did not begin as a limited exercise in diplomatic pressure. It began with assassinations, demands for regime change, promises of overwhelming military victory, and repeated claims that Iran’s nuclear programme would be destroyed once and for all. None of this happened.

The regime survived. Indeed, it emerged in a more hard-line and militarised form than before. Iranian influence throughout the region remains substantial. The Strait of Hormuz was closed. The nuclear issue remains open. Countries dependent on Gulf energy increasingly negotiated directly with Tehran rather than relying on American protection. These are not signs of strategic success.

Faced with these realities, Mr Smith steadily retreats from the original objectives and substitutes new ones. By the end of the article, the definition of victory has been reduced so far that almost any outcome short of complete catastrophe can be presented as success. This is not analysis. It is rationalisation.

The discussion of propaganda suffers from the same defect. Mr Smith attributes much of Iran’s success in the information war to social-media operations and failures in White House messaging. But Iran won much of the information war because it seemed to be telling the truth in all that mattered. When official claims repeatedly collide with visible events, propaganda becomes self-parody.

Nor was President Trump’s own conduct helpful. His public statements frequently alternated between declarations of imminent victory, threats of escalation, promises of peace, boasts about total destruction, and demands for negotiations. Incoherent messaging is often a symptom of strategic incoherence.

Mr Smith also places considerable weight on the continued loyalty of Mr Trump’s political base. This proves little. More revealing is what happened internationally: the erosion of American predominance in the Middle East, stronger incentives for regional states to diversify their relationships, and closer cooperation among China, Russia, and Iran.

Even if one accepts Mr Smith’s assessment of particular Russian and Chinese weapons systems, it misses the larger point. The conflict demonstrated that the United States could employ overwhelming and overwhelmingly expensive force, and still fail to achieve the political outcome it desired. Military superiority is useful. Political superiority is decisive.

Most importantly, Mr Smith never adequately explains what concrete American interest was advanced by the war.

Conclusion

Brandon Smith has produced an intelligent and carefully argued defence of the Trump administration’s conduct of the war. He is undoubtedly correct that many criticisms of the conflict have been exaggerated. He is also correct that some undesirable factions within Washington and the wider Western establishment have emerged politically damaged by the outcome. The difficulty is that he repeatedly mistakes the embarrassment of these factions for evidence of American success. A nation can expose the folly of its advisers and still lose a war. It can frustrate the ambitions of pressure groups and still emerge weaker than before. It can avoid catastrophe and still suffer strategic defeat.

The central question is not whether the neoconservatives were disappointed, whether the Israeli lobby secured everything it wanted, or whether progressive activists enjoyed the outcome. The central question is whether the United States achieved the objectives for which the war was launched. The answer appears to be no. The regime survived. The nuclear issue remains unresolved. Iran’s regional influence persists. The sanctions regime has been weakened. The Strait of Hormuz became a demonstration of Iranian leverage rather than American control. Regional states increasingly pursued accommodation with Tehran rather than reliance on Washington. The diplomatic and economic consequences of the conflict continue to unfold.

If America had genuinely won, there would be no need for reinterpretation. Victories usually announce themselves. Defeats require explanation. The simplest explanation is usually the correct one. America launched a war expecting submission and encountered resistance. It expected obedience and encountered defiance. It expected collapse and encountered endurance. It expected to dictate terms and ended by negotiating them. Mr Smith invites us to admire the cleverness of the retreat. What remains unexplained is why the retreat became necessary in the first place.

The more plausible conclusion is that the war exposed limits that American policymakers preferred not to acknowledge. The United States remains an important power. But it has emerged from this conflict looking less capable of imposing its will than before.

In short, this is not a triumph disguised as defeat. It is a defeat disguised as a triumph.