Sean Gabb
[This is promoted from a comment on a post by Alex Rantwell]
Suez was a moment of education from which the wrong lesson was drawn.
Conservative Governments since 1951 had believed that, while we no longer had all the freedom of action we’d had before 1939, the Americans could be relied on to underwrite our continuing pretensions. The Americans, for entirely valid reasons of their own, took the Suez adventure as an opportunity to tell their allies who was boss.
Had I been in charge in 1956, I’d have told the Americans to get stuffed, and gone on to smack the Egyptians hard. I’d have threatened the Americans with floating the pound, thereby breaking up their currency management scheme. With their anti-Communist crusade at risk, they’d probably have backed down.
This done, I’d have dumped the remaining Empire from a position of strength, and then radically sliced at the post-War state. I’d also have made it clear to the Americans that we were a semi-detached ally, willing to cooperate only so far as it was worth our interest in each case. Still being rational players rather than neo-con loons, they’d have scowled but gone along with this. And I’d have had a go at an economic accommodation with the French and Germans.
The result would have been a country with ambitions in keeping with its actual resources. We could have kept the pound stable, and a continuing great power status within a contracted area that might have included the Middle East, so long as we could use the Israelis as a proxy. We still had, at least in potential, a first rate industrial base. As in the reign of Charles II, we could have trimmed between the two stronger powers, keeping both from dominating us while something turned up.
I’d have done something like this even after the event of Suez as it actually proceeded. De Gaul did something similar after worse humiliations. His mistake was to be too corporatist in his economic policies.
In the event, the lesson we learned was that we should grovel in all things to the Americans, who would, in return, prop us up in the semblance of great power status. We still lost the Empire, but we also did nothing about an over-extended domestic state; and the loss of national pride meant that the social liberation of the 1960s went in often malign directions.
Suez could have been one of those moments when a drunk wakes up with a splitting head and resolves to turn himself round. All we did was reach for the bottle again.
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In his final years John Foster Dulles (the American Secretary of State at the time of Suez) asked Eden (who had been Prime Minister at the time of Suez) “Why did you not go on?” Dulles was baffled by why the British had withdrawn from Suez.
Certainly Herbert Hoover Jr (like his father anti British) who was in operational command of the State Department during Suez (Dulles being ill) made all sort of anti British noises – and Ike (who was in the middle of an election campaign) did not restrain him, especially as both Britain and the United States were busy condemning the Soviet attack on Hungary in that year.
As so often with a Sean post – the actual policy he suggests is fine, but the language he uses makes no sense.
Tell America to “get stuffed” – why? The Americans were not going to do anything against the Suez operation. Just carry on the operation against the socialist dictator Nasser – who had broken the treaty he had only signed in 1954 and occupied the Canal Zone.
“Threaten” to float the Pound – no just stop trying to rig the exchange rate (the end of exchange rate rigging had been suggested by “Rab” Butler before Suez anyway) – pretending that the Pound was worth a lot compared to the Dollar was not some American plot that Britain could “threaten” to leave, it was actually a sop to British pride – a pretence that the British inflation (increase of the money supply) during World War II and after it (the insane effort to build a Welfare State in a bankrupt post war Britain) had not happened.
Just admit the truth – that the Pound was not worth what the BRITISH (not the American) government pretended that it was worth. But no – this farce of pretending that British Pound “in your pocket” was worth a lot more than it really was carried on all through the 1960s.
Why ask the Americans to stop a “run on the Pound” in 1956 (thus being like the advisers to King Canute – who he got a bit wet, in order to stop their endless flattery which was annoying him). Just allow the exchange rate to reflect the truth – and carry on the military operation to victory.
Eden should have ignored the we-are-doomed of “first in, first out” Harold M. – “Super Mac” wanted to be Prime Minster and did everything he could to undermine Eden (that Britain was at war, and by undermining the Prime Minister he was also undermining the country – well that was not very important to “Super Mac”).
Lastly on this so called American “Crusade” against Marxism.
If there had been such a “crusade” (as Sean Gabb claims there was) then the Americans would have used their atomic monopoly from 1945 to 1949 to crush Communism – they did NOT do so.
In fact the Truman Administration even allowed China to fall to the Communists – a decision that led to the largest scale mass murderer in human history, Mao, being able to murder many tens of millions of people. See “The Black Book of Communism” and “Mao: The Untold Story” – as well as the works of Frank Dikotter such as “The Tragedy of Liberation” and “Mao’s Great Famine”.
Even in 1956 it is contested (there are arguments on both sides) whether Soviet bombers could have penetrated American aid defence (and long range Soviet missiles in 1956 were few and wildly inaccurate) – whereas the United States Air Force and United States Navy could have reduced Soviet cities to radioactive rubble – they did NOT do so.
There was no aggressive anti Communist “crusade” by the United States – there was an effort to CONTAIN Marxism till internal economic factors (the basic fact that socialism-does-not-work) destroyed the Soviet Union. To prevent Marxist world conquest (the aim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from its foundation – the Soviet Union was NOT “Russia”).
The effort by some people to pretend that the allies were in the wrong in the Cold War (that such things as the Berlin Airlift or the Korean War were not necessary) is both stupid and offensive – as is the effort to pretend peace could have been maintained with Mr Hitler and the National Socialists during World War II. Or the pretence that First World War was “six of one and half a dozen of the other” – rather than what it actually was, an effort by the Imperial German regime to invade and dominate the rest of Europe, with the aim of making Germany the great power of the world (with Britain being destroyed or dominated).
Libertarianism should not be based upon lies.
And the “we could have had peace – if only it was not for evil British and American war mongers” view of the Cold War, World War II and (yes) World War One, is a lie.
Returning to the Suez operation itself – it also shows the poisonous effect of lies.
Instead of attacking at once when the socialist dictator Nasser attacked the Canal Zone in 1956 (thus breaking the treaty he had agreed to in 1954) Eden just blustered – why?
Because the treaty of 1954 had been Eden’s baby – he had demanded that Winston Churchill (who warned that Nasser could not be trusted) accept the deal, and Churchill, old and ill, had given way.
British forces were withdrawn from the Canal Zone in 1954 – just as British forces had done nothing to defend the King of Egypt and the Parliament of Egypt (it is often forgotten that Egypt had an elected Parliament) against the socialist military coup (sorry “Popular Revolution”) of 1952.
To the socialist dictator Nasser all this was a clear show of WEAKNESS.
He would squeeze the British and Americans for aid – and then go over to the Soviets (which he always intended to do – after he had squeezed as much aid as he could out of the gullible West).
What did Eden eventually do?
Instead of going in to openly overthrow Nasser, or even reclaim the canal zone – a weird plan was come up with.
The British and French asked the Israelis to attack Nasser’s forces – and then they the British and French would step in as “peace keepers” and reclaim the canal zone.
Complex plans (based upon lies) are not good.
If Eden was not prepared to do the right thing – admit that the 1954 deal was a terrible blunder and attack openly, he certainly should not have engaged with the French in such a complex scheme.
I think that the real reason the British collapsed so quickly in 1956 was nothing to do with “the Americans” – it was the deceitful nature of the operation in the first place.
Instead of “you have broken the agreement and attacked the canal zone – we are going to hit you and hit you hard”.
We get – “you Israelis please attack Nasser’s forces – we will not admit we asked you do it (in fact we will pretend to be neutral), but will use the war as a excuse to go in and get the canal zone back”.
Convoluted schemes like that are asking for defeat.
Policy based upon “interests”, rather than PRINCIPLE, is contemptible.
First get your principles right (and be open about them) and then work out policies that are consistent with those principles.
Asking men to risk their lives to fight the forces of the vicious socialist dictator Nasser, in order to regain the Canal Zone, is honourable.
Asking men to risk their lives – in a pretend “peace keeping” operation (which is, in fact, nothing of the kind) is not honourable.
The collapse of Western influence in the Middle East after 1956 – the rise of socialist dictatorships (not democratic governments that allow themselves to be voted out of office) in Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, Syria…. (all following the terrible Egyptian example – with Nasser being treated as a hero) was a result of the failure at Suez in 1956.
The British failed because they were half hearted – their hearts were never really in the operation. And they were not truly committed because they (at least at the top level – but the feeling spread down the ranks) felt that the operation was not open and above board – there was a convoluted (dishonourable) element to it. And that the French (not the British) first came up with the idea, does not alter this.
Policy must be honourable – it must based upon principle.
As the Ulster saying has it……
“Say what you mean, and mean what you say – and be prepared to die for it”.
That is the only honourable basis for policy.
“we could have trimmed between the two stronger powers” meaning the United State and the Soviet Union (as if Britain was not part of the West at all – and could somehow be neutral in the struggle against totalitarianism taking over the world).
And “neo con loons” (in 1956?).
In the name of reason Sean – why do you write like this?
I know have asked you many times before – but I would really likely to know.
You know what you are writing is nonsense – but you do it anyway.
What I want to know is why.
Although, at least in this world, I suspect that I will never learn the true answer.
If both of us, somehow, make it to heaven – you can explain it all to me then.
We can sit down and have a drink, whilst listening to the harp music, and you can explain it all to me then.
As is often the case, you misunderstand me and the facts. I will avoid discussion the two big wars of the 20th century, because there is no prospect of agreement, and I am too busy and tired to go over the same ground. However, I will reply to a number of points.
The Americans liked the Bretton Woods system because there are moral and economic advantages to operating a reserve currency. A withdrawal of sterling in 1956 would have been a serious embarrassment. This being said, it would have been inconvenient for us to withdraw. After Labour’s devaluation, the equilibrium and fixed rates were not that far apart in 1956, and could have been moved closer had public spending been cut.
I like fixed rate regimes. you may recall that I was in favour of our membership of the ERM. Fixed rates impose some political discipline on domestic monetary policy. But floating the pound in 1956 would have been less inconvenient to us in the short term than it would have been to the Americans.
You assume that my posting is anti-American. In fact, I regard it as a legitimate foreign policy objective for the Americans in the 1950s to make it unambiguously clear that they rather than we were now the hegemonic power through much of the world. I regret that this had become possible, but don’t blame the Americans for taking the same advantage of us as we took of the Dutch after 1701.
My point is that we should have demanded better transitional arrangements of the Americans than we did. They wanted to knock us off our perch. At the same time, they needed us as a junior partner. That made room for a deal that we were foolish not to demand.
Before they took leave of their senses after 1990, the American elites were generally realistic within the constraints of the foreign policy they had chosen. We can see this in 1982. One of their client states had attacked us. It would have suited them had we rolled over. The moment it was made clear that we wouldn’t, they calculated that keeping us sweet was worth more than keeping a friendly junta going in Argentina. All the talk of the Reagan-Thatcher love affair is so much window dressing. I don’t at all blame the Americans for 1956. Bearing in mind we were in a stronger position then than we were in 1982, I much condemn Eden and Macmillan for not turning nasty. I have no doubt that, after much screaming down the telephone, they would have come back with a satisfactory offer.
Because we share a language and history, and because we are both more than averagely powerful in the world, the Anglo-American relationship is necessarily complex. We are joined at the hip in some respects and bitter rivals in others. Even today, the relationship could be arranged to greater British advantage than it is. The main problem is in London.
“The Americans were not going to do anything against the Suez operation.”
Actually they were. They prepared to attack and stalked British and French ships. See http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2014/06/blast-the-hell-out-of-them-some-thoughts-on-the-special-relationship.html
“James James”.
I see you get the (utterly false) idea that the United States Navy was going to attack British and French ships in 1956 from Mr Peter Hitchens.
I will leave you with your fan of Mr Putin – and his (Mr Hitchens) demands that the railways be renationalised (Network Rail is in fact 100% government owned, so to “re” nationalise it is logically impossible). Other than to point out that to claim the United States Navy was going to attack the Royal Navy in 1956 is a lie – and a contemptible lie.
Sean.
As so often my suspicion is that you do not mean what you are saying – but I have been told (by Ian B. and others) that I should assume you DO believe what you write.
Very well then.
You should the government rigging – “fixing” – of exchange rates.
In short you support the mass unemployment of the late 1920s Britain – and the demands that the American Federal Reserve prop up the (artificial) exchange rate by expanding the American money supply – thus leading to the boom-bust which created the tragic 1930s.
You also support the insane rigging (“fixing”) of the exchange rate after World War II that made independent action by the British government (not just Suez) impractical. And helped lead to the relative decline of British manufacturing in the post war period – by undermining exports and promoting imports of manufactured goods. There is nothing wrong with imports – if it is a natural process, but not if it is a process brought on by a rigged “fixed” exchange rate.
And you support the rigging “fixing” of the exchange rate by Mr Laws in the mid 1980s – that led to the boom-bust crises that ended this period.
Well then Sean – Mr George Soros should send you a thank you card, as he was just about the only person who benefitted from this insanity.
Something is worth what the market says it is worth – no more and no less.
Exchange rate rigging “fixing” is, therefore, demented.
The only way that two different counties can have the same exchange rate naturally over time – is if they use the same money. For example gold.
In Britain and the United States before the First World War the money may have been called “Pounds” or “Dollars” – but in fact the money was gold (the same money in both countries).
In Britain gold coins were in normal circulation (there was cheating by the Bank of England – but it was kept within narrow limits) – and in the United States Federal Reserve notes (indeed the Federal Reserve system itself) did not even exist till 1913.
So it is improper to speak of the “exchange rate” before 1914 – as most civilised countries use the same money, gold, they just called it by different names.
Mr. Hitchens has made it perfectly plain that he is no fan of Putin.
Turning to other matters….
Sean you claim (and I am to assume you actually mean the false things you write) that the United States aimed to be a “hegemonic” power after World War II.
This is obviously false – as, had it been true, the United States would have used its nuclear monopoly against the Soviet Union. The Hobbesian Bertrand Russell (who previously had supported submission to Adolf Hitler – on Hobbesian grounds) actually urged the United States to do this – and become the hegemon ruling-the-world. It was only when the United States refused to do this that Bertrand Russell turned to the Soviet Union and helped set up CND, and “the 100” (the organisation that helped Soviet agent George Blake escape from prison), and his other KGB front organisation activities. All his life Professor Russell was much more a follower of Thomas Hobbes than he was of Karl Marx.
The actual aim of United States policy (of which you claim to be unaware) was to CONTAIN Marxism till such time as internal problems (the basic fact that socialism does-not-work) brought down the Soviet Union and the rest.
Wars such as Korea could not be avoided (if Marxism was to be contained – prevented from world conquest) – but general war could be avoided.
Many good people died in the Cold War to contain Marxism.
And you, Sean Gabb, write as if it was some great power game – about “interests” and the desire to be a “hegemon” and other such rubbish.
May God forgive you.
You really should try to overcome your tendency to believe that anyone who doesn’t share your opinions is morally tainted. At the least, it can make debate an unprofitable activity.
Er Paul, all that your thoughts on this one show is the fully-understood truth that that fascist leftoNazi pig Bertrand Russell was a scumbag of the bigger kind than ordinary kinds… a position I think you’d agree with anyway.
As to Hobbes, I’ve never read him so I have no idea what the bugger says, but if you decided you wanted for example to be a “Hegemon”, then I guess it would be nice for you, which is why so many dudes try to be one. As a Hegemon, you might be able to “have” any woman you decided you would like to have, for example, like Ghenghiz Khan or Khosroes of whom Mr Blake writes, or Mao or (certain prophets I cannot mention), or Joe Kennedy and his sons whose girlfriends he’d often try to roger.
Now Paul, er, people don’t consciously and with-intent write “false things” on this blog. People write what they think is right, as do you.
Get a grip now Paul, decide just that people write what they do because they think it contributes to understanding what the right answer is, as you do,
Interesting expansion on this, I’ll have to use more throw away lines to learn about episodes of history I am a bit hazy on.
Sounds like a bit of hyperbole from Hitchens there. Admiral Burke was a military man and it appears he wanted to impress on Dulles that if they were going to use the threat of military force against Britain and France over Suez then they had to be prepared to follow through with it, or they would lose credibility.
It doesn’t seem there was ever any realistic prospect of the US attacking British forces.
That’s a reasonable interpretation, though General Sir Charles Keightley, Commander of Middle East Land Forces disagreed: “‘It was the action of the US which really defeated us in attaining our object.’ He complained that the movements of the US Sixth Fleet ‘endangered the whole of our relations with that country’.” (quoted by Hitchens)